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THE PRODUCTION EFFORT

- I. The task of the Directorate of Intelligence, the Office of National Estimates, and the Directorate of Science and Technology is that of synthesizing information from all sources and presenting the product--in various forms--to the policy-maker. To take first the supporting offices, which answer to the Director of Intelligence Support:
 - A. The link between the sources and the analytical effort is the Collection Guidance Staff, charged with expressing all of the collection needs to all of the collectors.
 1. The Staff has four China officers, who open and close hundreds of requirements on China annually.
 - B. The procurement and dissemination of documents, the maintenance of central reference and document retrieval services, and the processing of foreign language materials--these are the main responsibilities of the Office of Central Reference.

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the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of
the Central Intelligence Agency.

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1. OCR has 66 full-time workers on China, including 24 translators and 7 biographic specialists.
2. Examples of its annual activity on China: 120,000 documents procured and disseminated; 80,000 documents indexed; 97,000 pages of Chinese materials processed; 5,400 file searches.
3. OCR includes the CHIVE operation, working toward a new computer-supported central reference facility; the exercise is now entirely geared to China, as the China unit is to be the first operational unit.
4. OCR's Biographic Register maintains files on 90,000 Chinese, services requests for information on them, and issues several biographic publications.
5. The monitoring of foreign broadcasts, the translation and dissemination of this material, and the regular analysis of it as a thing in itself--these are the responsibilities of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

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1. There are 52 FBIS employees, including five analysts, engaged in monitoring, publishing, and analyzing the hundreds of hours of Chinese broadcasts (about 100,000 talks and commentaries annually).
2. The Radio Propaganda Division (RPD) examines Chinese radio and press propaganda on foreign, intra-bloc, and domestic affairs. More than 90 percent of RPD's 16-man analysis staff devotes varying degrees of time to Chinese source materials.
3. Analysis of Chinese propaganda is included regularly and extensively in RPD's two periodicals and in many of its special reports. All RPD publications are disseminated in 400 to 500 copies to intelligence community components and other government offices in Washington, to U.S. embassies and overseas military installations, and to some NATO and SEATO governments.
 - a. The Trends and Highlights of Communist Bloc Broadcasts is a weekly synthesis of propaganda highlights, focused

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primarily on international issues and developments of immediate concern. Quantitative data on Peking radio propaganda is included in tabular form. Normally three or four pages, it is being issued in expanded form during the Vietnam crisis, with advance-distribution copies to the White House, the State and Defense Department, and Agency officials.

- b. The Survey of Communist Bloc Broadcasts, published every other week and averaging about 50 pages, provides a fuller documentary record and analysis covering a wider range of subjects, reconstructing relevant background to place current material in perspective.

- c. Radio Propaganda Reports, issued irregularly both on FBIS' initiative and in response to consumer requests, constitute RPD's format for all special reports and studies apart from limited-distribution memorandums for individual recipients.

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D. The collection of intelligence on China from domestic sources (including aliens), and the acquisition and analysis of Chinese products are the responsibilities of the Domestic Contact Service.

1. In the Washington headquarters, three case officers are occupied with China full-time, and five others part-time; all of the 143 field contact specialists work on China to some extent.
2. The DCS each year publishes hundreds of intelligence reports on China and collects and analyzes numerous Chinese products.
3. The DD/I has 138 people working full time on China in the National Photographic Interpretation Center.
 1. The great majority are photographic intelligence analysts contributing to the national service.
 2. The Imagery Analysis Division responds to requirements from CIA, and provides photographic intelligence reports, substantive briefings and other services.

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- a. In the past year, the IAD has had the equivalent of 13 full-time analysts on China projects--almost one-fifth of IAD's total production effort.
- b. IAD produced hundreds of reports on China in this period, mainly on military-related matters.

II. These DD/I offices which we think of as production components--as distinct from the foregoing offices which have primarily support functions--are the Office of Basic Intelligence, the Office of Current Intelligence, the Office of Research and Reports, the DD/I Research Staff, and the CIA/DIA Joint Analysis Group.

- A. The production of the National Intelligence Survey on China (certain kinds of basic or background intelligence), of all-source geographic and related environmental intelligence, and of all-source intelligence maps (as well as maintenance of a map collection and reference service)--these are the responsibilities of the Office of Basic Intelligence.

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1. O/BI has the equivalent of 15 full-time workers on China.
2. As for O/BI's publications, and their audience:
 - a. The NIS is an across-the-board basic reference work; OBI directs and edits it.
 - b. Geographic Intelligence Memoranda (GM) are ad hoc reports that compactly record and interpret environmental factors bearing on foreign developments of major security interest to the U.S. They are distributed both inside and outside CIA, to policy-level officials.
 - c. Geographic Intelligence Reports (GR) are ad hoc studies in depth of foreign geographic subjects having intelligence significance. Consumers are mainly working analysts and intelligence reference librarians.
 - d. Geographic Support Studies (GS) are ad hoc studies in depth produced in response to a specific internal CIA requirement, usually from the DDP. Most

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of Geography Division's production outside of the Intelligence Map Program is disseminated in the form of these studies. The majority of GS studies, in turn, are produced in direct support of clandestine operational planning.

- e. Geographic Intelligence Briefs (GB) are ad hoc, narrowly-oriented, short special support or special reporting studies. They may (1) bear on routine needs of research, estimates, and planning activities in the Government, or (2) constitute working papers and short research support projects for internal CIA use only.
- f. The Intelligence Map Program (Special Intelligence Graphic (SIG)) is designed to provide accurate, up-to-date maps of Communist China at the SECRET level that show all significant intelligence targets and constitute a systematic all-source summary of evaluated intelligence in support of research, estimates, and

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operations. The Army Map Service is responsible for the base map and Geography Division (with aid from OCR and NPIC) is responsible for quality control and the intelligence overlay on the map. The first sheets (at 1:250,000) are in work; most of the priority sheets will be completed in 2 years and total coverage will be attained in about 5 years. Dissemination will be wide.

B. The reporting of current intelligence on China (except for purely economic items) is the responsibility of the Office of Current Intelligence.

1. O/CI also produces much of the staff intelligence on China (i.e., backup material to clarify current developments), some of the basic or background intelligence (political sections of the NIS), and some of the political research (e.g. on dissidence).
2. Most of this is produced by the China and Asian Satellites Division, which has 11 analysts working full time on across-the-

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board Chinese Communist affairs: five on foreign policy, three on internal developments, and three on military problems.

3. However, current reporting on the Chinese advanced weapons and space programs is the responsibility of the Military Division of O/CI, which puts the equivalent of the full time of two men on the problem.

4. O/CI's China reporting appears in three kinds of daily Bulletins (the Current Intelligence Bulletin, for coordinated national intelligence; the Current Intelligence Digest, OCI's own daily publication; and China Highlights, an informal China Division publication), in two weekly reviews (one all-source, one Secret Level), in a Monthly Political Report (a joint OCI/DDP round-up of important developments in China, plus indications of dissidence there), in a host of ad hoc memoranda and in many briefings, totalling hundreds of pages per month.

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5. O/CI publications are directed to all levels of the U.S. Government.
 - a. The CIB, memoranda, and briefings are intended for the highest levels, including the President, the Cabinet members, the National Security Council, and other policy making officials.
 - b. The CINS, CIWR, CID, and some of the studies are intended for officials on the second level within the government, and also for working analysts in components outside of CIA.
 - c. The Daily Highlights of CAS Division are used to alert officials within CIA to developments on a daily basis within China, and are also intended as a working tool for analysts concerned with Chinese affairs.
 - d. The Monthly Report goes to all these levels of government.
 - e. Briefings are prepared for the executive branch of government and are also directed to concerned Congressional Committees.

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6. The China/Asian Satellites Division also provides--in the Chief of the Division--the Chief of the new China Task Force.
- C. Economic Intelligence on China (both research and current intelligence), and basic research (as distinct from current intelligence) on the military programs of China, are the responsibility of the Office of Research and Reports.
1. The Economic Research Area of ORR produces and coordinates all-source economic intelligence on Communist China. Currently research continues to probe the prospects for economic recovery, the problems of agriculture and food supply, the status of the defense industries, developments in construction and transportation, and those foreign economic relations of importance to U.S. security.
 2. To carry out this program of research, 25 analysts work wholly or largely on China, three doing current intelligence reporting, four doing research on agriculture, ten on industry (including

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defense industry), six on construction, transportation, and communication, and three on foreign trade.

2. The Military Research Area of O/RR, with five full-time and four part-time analysts of Chinese affairs (the equivalent of one full-time), works on weapons production and deployment, allocation of manpower and resources in armed forces, and costs of the military establishment.
3. Both areas of O/RR contribute to National Intelligence Estimates, the National Intelligence Survey, and the current intelligence publications, and both undertake self-initiated basic research reports. Both areas also reply extensively to requests from the Executive Office of the President, committees of Congress, USIB agencies, interagency groups, and other CIA offices.
4. Political Research -- on complex problems requiring concentrated research over a prolonged period -- is centered in the small DD/I Research Staff.

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1. Its four analysts of Chinese affairs do studies in depth of Sino-Soviet relations and the world Communist movement, Chinese foreign and domestic affairs, and the Chinese leadership, contribute to national estimates, do briefings, and write for outside publications. The Staff's audience has included all levels of the government, from the President on down.
2. The Staff also coordinates some Agency-wide China efforts (e.g., the quadripartite conference on China in 1965, exchanges of research with the Commonwealth, the work of the recent China Intelligence Study Group), is the DD/I's link with external research, and supplies the secretariat for the new China Task Force.
- E. The CIA/DIA Joint Analysis Group (JAG) is concerned with long-range projections of Communist military forces.
 1. Consisting of three senior military officers detailed by DIA and three senior intelligence officers of CIA, and established in

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1962 to provide long-range projections of Soviet military forces for use by the Secretary of Defense and the military services in planning and assessing future U.S. force requirements, JAG is now making a projection of alternative Chinese Communist forces over the next 10-15 years; this should be completed this spring.

2. The JAG projections begin from agreed national intelligence estimates and are meant to reflect, as far as possible, the best judgments of the intelligence community on such matters as economic and technological feasibility. However, these projections go beyond periods which can be effectively handled in estimates; they consist of hypothetical force packages, designed to illustrate what the Soviets or Chinese might reasonably seek to achieve under various force planning concepts they might consider, rather than predictions of exactly what the future Soviet or Chinese force structure will actually be.

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3. Drafts of JAS studies are normally circulated to interested specialists throughout the intelligence community for comment, but the final versions are issued under the authority of the DCI and General Carroll without formal coordination with other USIB members.
7. The DD/I has just established a China Task Force whose purpose is to provide (a) a focal point for the monitoring of all of the Agency's intelligence production on Communist China and (b) a focal point for receiving for the DD/I requests relating to China.
1. The China Task Force, headed by a Chief operating under the direction of the DD/I, represents the DD/X, the Deputy Director for Science and Technology, and the Office of National Estimates on the DCI China Coordinator's group.
2. The Task Force is to:
 - a. support the work of the DCI China Coordinator;
 - b. assess the progress of the Agency's production programs on China toward

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answering the priority intelligence questions (including the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of Communist China), examine the relationships of these programs to one another, and make recommendations for improvement in both respects;

- c. review substantive developments and recommend the revision of production programs in response to these developments;
 - d. receive for the DD/I requests for unscheduled production;
 - e. monitor the work of the supporting components of the Directorate of Intelligence and make recommendations for improvement; and
 - f. monitor relations with the China centers in universities and with the academic consultants on China.
3. In carrying out these duties, the Chief of the China Task Force (concurrently Chief of China Division, OOI) reports directly to

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the DD/I and makes recommendations as appropriate.

4. The China Task Force includes

- a. a secretariat, comprised of elements of the former China Intelligence Study Group (CHINTELL), which had been carrying out some of the functions now assigned to the CTF; and
- b. representatives of all of the major components of the Directorate of Intelligence concerned with production on China, of the Office of National Estimates, of the Directorate of Science and Technology, and of selected supporting components, as well as the coordinators of special projects.

III. The Office of National Estimates--which is no longer a component of the Directorate of Intelligence, and now reports directly to the DCI--organizes, coordinates and publishes national estimates of trends and developments important to U.S. security.

- A. Some of these estimates are regularly scheduled, and some (the SNIE's) are requested ad hoc

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(usually on a crash basis) by the White House, State, Defense, and the Joint Chiefs.

3. The Board of National Estimates, which now has 12 members on active duty, devotes a considerable amount of its time to Communist China; and the Far East Staff of O/NE--which coordinates contributions from USIB agencies and drafts the estimates--has three men full-time on China.

3. In the past year, four estimates have been concerned wholly with China, 12 estimates on Vietnam have included estimates of Chinese intentions and reactions; and there have been four O/NE memos on China.

D. The Board has recently added two senior officers with many years of experience on Far Eastern and Chinese affairs, and the Far East Staff is increasing its strength to four analysts working full time on China.

IV. The Directorate of Science and Technology--through its Office of Scientific Intelligence and its Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center--is the

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intelligence community's principal producer of finished intelligence on Communist China's science and technology.

A. O/SI is concerned primarily with:

1. scientific resources;
2. the research, development and prototype testing of air defense systems, cruise missile systems, aircraft, and naval vessels and equipment;
3. scientific space activities;
4. nuclear energy;
5. unconventional warfare;
6. and the physical, engineering and life sciences.

B. FESAC is engaged in analysis of the research, development and testing of Chinese offensive ballistic missile systems.

1. This includes the tactical short-range systems, IRBMs and ICBMs and ICBMs, and any space booster applications Peking might eventually make.

C. Divisions in both offices engage in both current and in-depth reporting.

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1. Current intelligence is released through daily, weekly and monthly publications, briefs, and appropriate DD/I publications.
 2. Research in depth results in Office reports, research aids, and working papers.
 3. Both types of reporting support contributions to NIE's, NIS's and various USIB committee papers.
 4. O/SI also participated to a large extent in the production last year of a particularly valuable study, "China's Science and Technology Through 1970", by USIB's Scientific Intelligence Committee.
- D. The publications serve the policy maker and the analyst level as well.
1. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and Scientific Advisory Committee and the 303 Committee all receive these publications; some are distributed only to this level.
 2. Large numbers of DD/S&T publications are disseminated throughout the intelligence community from the Secretary of

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State and Secretary of Defense on down, including NASA and the National Space Council.

3. Consultants, contractors, and scientists throughout the nation also receive items of interest to them, both for information and for constructive criticism.
 4. Some papers also go to our Commonwealth counterparts.
 5. Publications at the Secret level generally have an audience of from 250 to 600, while the higher classified reports have correspondingly less circulation.
- E. O/SI has a substantial effort allotted to Communist China, and FMSAC a small one. Both are expanding.
1. Some 25 O/SI analysts (about 11% of the analytical strength) spend one-fourth or more of their time working on Communist China: this effort currently totals about 20 man-years annually.
 - a. Since O/SI created a China Committee in 1961 to coordinate and stimulate

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
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China work, the O/SI research effort has more than doubled. The 1966 Work Program contains 24 active projects, about half of which have led or will lead to in-depth publications during 1966.

2. FMSAC devotes three to five man-years annually to the Chinese aspect of its concern.
3. O/SI plans to increase its effort on China by seven to 10 man-years by mid-1967, and FMSAC will increase its effort by one man-year or more.
- a. O/SI is also developing several more external analysis contracts with scientists and engineers who can exploit available foreign-language material.

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PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE ON CHINA



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